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A B S T R A C T
Maternity care continues to be associated with avoidable harm that can result in serious disability and profound
anguish for women, their children, and their families, and in high costs for healthcare systems. As in other areas
of healthcare, improvement efforts have typically focused either on implementing and evaluating specific in-
terventions, or on identifying the contextual features that may be generative of safety (e.g. structures, processes,
behaviour, practices, and values), but the dialogue between these two approaches has remained limited. In this
article, we report a positive deviance case study of a high-performing UK maternity unit to examine how it
achieved and sustained excellent safety outcomes. Based on 143 h of ethnographic observations in the maternity
unit, 12 semi-structured interviews, and two focus groups with staff, we identified six mechanisms that appeared
to be important for safety: collective competence; insistence on technical proficiency; monitoring, coordination,
and distributed cognition; clearly articulated and constantly reinforced standards of practice, behaviour, and
ethics; monitoring multiple sources of intelligence about the unit's state of safety; and a highly intentional
approach to safety and improvement. These mechanisms were nurtured and sustained through both a specific
intervention (known as the PROMPT programme) and, importantly, the unit's contextual features: intervention
and context shaped each other in both direct and indirect ways. The mechanisms were also influenced by the
unit's structural conditions, such as staffing levels and physical environment. This study enhances understanding
of what makes a maternity unit safe, paving the way for better design of improvement approaches. It also
advances the debate on quality and safety improvement by offering a theoretically and empirically grounded
analysis of the interplay between interventions and context of implementation.
1. Introduction
Improving newborn and maternal health is increasingly high on the
global health agenda (WHO, 2017), but the safety of maternity care
remains problematic worldwide. Avoidable harm in maternity services
results in serious disability and profound anguish for women, their
children, and their families (Andreasen et al., 2012), and imposes
substantial burdens on health systems, including the cost associated
with litigation (Magro, 2017). Though much has been learned from
inquiries and investigations into adverse events in maternity care
(Kirkup, 2015; Knight et al., 2017; Kurinczuk et al., 2014), the resulting
recommendations have not, as in other areas of quality and safety (Card
et al., 2012), always had impacts that are as powerful or consistent as
might be hoped. Evidence-based approaches to making improvement
are thus much needed (Dixon-Woods and Martin, 2016).
Two major approaches to improvement may heuristically be dis-
tinguished, based largely on their underlying logics. One draws on a
logic of intervention. Here, a specific, bounded intervention (such as a
checklist, decision-support system, or care bundle) is defined and im-
plemented. This approach lends itself to evaluative study designs aimed
at determining the impact of the intervention on pre-specified outcomes
(Portela et al., 2015). Such studies may produce evidence of the average
effects of an intervention, but are less good at explaining why varia-
bility in those effects occur in different places. When the role of context
is discussed, it is usually of interest for how it might modify the effects
of an intervention, often described using a “barriers and facilitators”
discourse (Szymczak, 2018).
The second approach is based on a logic of context. Identifying the
features of particular environments (such as organisational structures,
processes, behaviours, practices, and values) that contribute to safety, it
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is the approach used, for example, in studies of high reliability orga-
nisations, as reported by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001):
(1) Preoccupation with failures rather than successes, (2) reluctance to
simplify interpretations, (3) sensitivity to operations, (4) commitment to
resilience and (5) deference to expertise, as exhibited by encouragement
of a fluid decision-making system. Together these five processes produce
a collective state of mindfulness.
The focus on context as generative of safety underpins the recent
turn from a Safety-I paradigm (preoccupied with fixing adverse events
that have already occurred) to Safety-II (focusing on system flexibility
and resilience, as well as behaviours and processes that produce suc-
cessful practice) (Hollnagel, 2014). However, a major challenge for
approaches that urge the reproduction of features of context is that they
lend themselves much less easily to traditional evaluative techniques,
inhibiting the development of the kind of evidence-base that may be
most persuasive to clinical and policy audiences. A further risk is that, if
applied at too high a level of abstraction, research about particular
contexts may simply reproduce high-level thematic categories that are
already well-known – such as leadership, culture and use of data –
without being sufficiently informative and specific about what precisely
needs to be done in order to achieve the same results elsewhere
(Vincent and Amalberti, 2016).
A challenge for both approaches is that the dialogue between them
has remained limited, in part because of epistemological divides that
fail to unite accounts of specific interventions aimed at improvement
and accounts of contexts that might be generative of improvement
(Dixon-Woods, 2014; Howarth et al., 2016). Yet, as some have begun to
argue, particularly in the public health field (Rutter et al., 2017) much
is likely to be gained by a complex systems approach that recognises the
ways that interventions and contexts are co-constitutive and mutually
emergent.
In this article, we examine the role of both the contextual features
and a specific intervention in contributing to excellence, using a posi-
tive deviance (Lawton et al., 2014) case study of a high-performing
maternity unit. Positive deviance studies seek to produce learning by
examining individuals, teams, or organisations that show exceptionally
good performance. However, the forces that create positive conditions
for safety may be at least partially invisible to those who create them
because they remain tacit or habitualised. In-depth, qualitative ex-
aminations of positively deviant settings are thus needed (Lawton et al.,
2014).
We focus our analysis on a maternity unit at Southmead Hospital in
Bristol, UK. Using an operational definition of safety as the control and
management of risk over time to maximise benefit and to minimise
harm (Vincent and Amalberti, 2016), Southmead can be seen as an
example of positive deviance when measured by its rates of birth
complications, which are among the lowest in the UK published lit-
erature (Draycott, 2013). Additionally, the unit has reported improve-
ments on a range of clinically relevant perinatal outcome measures over
a sustained period from 2001, including a 100% reduction in perma-
nent brachial plexus injuries (Crofts et al., 2016), a 50% reduction in
both hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and low 5-min Apgar score
(Draycott et al., 2006), a 50% reduction in the time taken to expedite
birth in potentially life-threatening cases of umbilical cord prolapse
(Siassakos et al., 2009), and improved composite neonatal outcomes,
including a reduction in the rate of neonatal intensive care admission
from 38% to 22% (Siassakos et al., 2009). Consistent with a more po-
sitive view of safety (Hollnagel, 2014), high performance is also evident
in staff attitude surveys indicating a positive safety culture, outstanding
teamwork climate, and high job satisfaction (Siassakos et al., 2011).
Using a logic of intervention, these improvements might be attrib-
uted to a training programme known as PROMPT (Practical Obstetric
Multi-Professional Training) (Box 1), which was developed at South-
mead in 2000, and has been continuously implemented, refined and
updated since. However, one reason for caution in attributing
improvement solely to PROMPT is that reliably propagating the success
seen at Southmead has not been straightforward. For example, the
implementation of PROMPT in an Australian state was associated with
some improvements, but the results were modest compared with those
seen in Southmead, and not all sites were able to implement the pro-
gramme as intended (Shoushtarian et al., 2014). This suggests a need to
understand the contextual features of Southmead that might be gen-
erative of safety, while retaining the possibility that PROMPT may
nonetheless have an important role.
In this article, we aim to characterise what makes Southmead safe,




Our analysis of context is limited to the maternity unit clinical
micro-system (Mohr et al., 2004); the hospital and wider policy and
structural context are outside the scope of this study. Southmead Hos-
pital (Bristol, UK) has a large maternity unit (approximately 6500 births
per year) serving some of the most deprived areas of Bristol. The
midwife-to-birth ratio is currently 1:30. Our access was facilitated by
two local collaborators (in senior positions in the unit, and co-authors
on this paper – TD and CW), who helped in ensuring staff and parents
were informed about the study and were happy to engage.
Attending the PROMPT programme annually is compulsory for all
staff working in the unit, including midwives (maternity unit, com-
munity, birth centre, and locum midwives), consultant obstetricians,
obstetric anaesthetists, maternity and healthcare assistants (MCAs and
HCAs), maternity theatre staff, and doctors in obstetric training.
Systems are in place to release staff from clinical activities to secure
95% attendance of all staff groups.
2.1.1. Data collection
We adopted an ethnographic approach (Hammersley and Atkinson,
2007), involving observations, semi-structured interviews, and focus
groups. To offer an in-depth, longitudinal and recursive analysis not
tied to specific individuals who happened to be on duty or specific
events, data for the study were collected in two phases: between Sep-
tember 2014 and March 2015 and between July and August 2017. This
approach allowed analytic depth by enabling exploration and probing
of issues identified in early observations and interviews.
Three researchers (JW, EL, CT) conducted approximately 143 h of
observations of between one and three days (including a night shift) in
the maternity unit. They also observed two PROMPT in-house training
events at Southmead and one national PROMPT train-the-trainers
event. Observations were open-ended (a predetermined observation
checklist was not used), but, consistent with our research aims, parti-
cular effort went into capturing how routines, interactions, social norms
and structures contributed to or interfered with safety. For observa-
tions, oral consent was obtained from participants, who were informed
about the researchers’ background as social scientists.
Two researchers (JW and EL) conducted 12 semi-structured inter-
views with nine clinicians working in the unit (five doctors and four
midwives, some of whom were involved in the local PROMPT pro-
gramme), and with three individuals with a management or risk man-
agement role.
Both in our field conversations and in interviews, we adopted a
maximum variability strategy to access as many different points of
views as possible on the issues of interest. Participants were selected in
consultation with the local collaborators to represent a range of dif-
ferent disciplines and seniority levels, and were approached by the
researchers during the fieldwork. Our recruitment process was guided
by the principle of information power (Malterud et al 2016), which
shifts the focus from the number of participants included in a sample to
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the power of information the sample holds.
Interviews focused on participants’ understanding of the mechan-
isms that contributed to, or hindered, safety in the unit, as well as al-
lowing follow-up on aspects of practice seen in observations. Interviews
lasted 60–120min and were conducted face-to-face or by telephone. JW
also conducted two focus groups, one involving midwives and MCAs,
and one with consultant obstetricians, anaesthetists, and doctors-in-
training. Interview and focus group participants signed a consent form.
The study received ethical approval from the London – Harrow
Research Ethics Committee.
2.1.2. Data analysis
Ethnographic data were captured both in the form of in situ field-
notes and audio-recorded debrief reflections that were recorded by
individual researchers at the end of each day's observations. Research
team debriefs were conducted to enable reflexivity and synthesis, and
were audio-recorded. All audio-recorded material (interviews, in-
dividual debriefs, and group debriefs) were transcribed verbatim,
anonymised, and included in the analysis. Documents collected on site
visits were also treated as data.
A systematic and iterative approach to analysis of the observation
and interview data was based on the constant comparative method
(Charmaz, 2014). A selection of transcripts was open-coded by EL and
SC. Key themes were identified through repeated close readings and
review of open codes. This allowed us to produce a coding framework,
which was used to conduct (and was updated throughout) the analysis
of the remaining transcripts. Analysis was enhanced by drawing on a
range of theoretical resources and sensitising concepts that we identi-
fied as relevant and useful in moving from description to interpretation,
including concepts from the sociology of work (e.g. normalisation of
deviance, jurisdictions and professional boundaries), organisational
theory (e.g. situated learning theory, legitimate peripheral participa-
tion, collective sense-making), and safety science (e.g. resilience and
high reliability, distributed cognition). As data collection and analysis
proceeded concurrently, we were able to discuss our preliminary find-
ings with participants and to use their feedback to test our emerging
analysis against their perceptions. QSR NVivo software was used to aid
the coding, management and retrieval of data.
3. Results
We identified a range of mechanisms that contributed to safety in
Southmead's maternity unit (Table 1). Our findings demonstrate how
safety emerges through an interplay between context and the inter-
vention (the PROMPT programme).
3.1. Collective competence
A defining feature of the unit was its collective competence: the kind
of collective performance that cannot be disaggregated into the sum of
individual competencies, but instead conforms to three normative
principles: making collective sense of events in the workplace, devel-
oping a sense of interdependency, and developing and using a collective
knowledge base (Boreham, 2004).
Several elements contributed to collective competence. The
PROMPT training days supported the development of social relation-
ships and a sense of interdependency, providing an opportunity for staff
to learn together and to develop their understanding of each other's
roles and responsibilities, as well as confidence in each other's technical
skills. Through the simulations, staff from different disciplines and roles
developed a shared mental model of the procedures for dealing with
emergencies: they could clarify mutual expectations, experiment with
different leadership and followership styles, pick up on each other's
social cues, and appreciate the valuable roles of all staff, including
porters and Maternity Care Assistants (MCAs).
The consultant said that the outcome for maternity patients really is
dependent upon the team understanding the whole [process of care de-
livery]. She said that part of it is due to how they'd all trained together,
they'd all been on the same course, they'd all been indoctrinated with the
same belief. (Observation, labour ward, 2017)
The values and aspirations of the unit were not formulated as cer-
emonial mission statements, nor were they imposed from the top.
Instead, various members of staff (midwives, doctors, MCAs, risk
managers, administrators, and others) consistently expressed a mutual
sense of “us”: they described a powerful feeling of belongingness,
identified with the unit's values, and experienced high levels of pride.
Shared goals across disciplines and professions were an especially
strong feature of collective competence on the unit. For instance, the
shared goal of “safe birth” helped to avert interdisciplinary tensions.
That's what makes Southmead different: there is true multi-profession-
alism. That culture of teamwork now … is embedded in the way we work
on a daily basis without even realising that we do it. (Consultant ob-
stetrician, 2017)
Effort went into socialising junior members into an ethos of col-
lective endeavour and mutual respect across roles and disciplines. For
example, medical students were assigned to a midwife mentor (rather
than a doctor) during their professional training. Most doctors were
seen to listen carefully and respectfully to midwives, with disagree-
ments settled through open discussion rather than deployment of per-
sonal or positional power.
The midwife coordinator and a senior obstetrician were trying to make a
plan for a woman, and there was a little bit of a discussion about her,
because the obstetrician really wanted to bring [the woman] up to the
central delivery suite right away. But [the obstetrician] then actually
listened to the midwife coordinator and agreed to go down to the day
assessment unit to look at the lady beforehand. (Observation in the
Box 1
What is the PROMPT programme?
PROMPT (PRactical Obstetric Multi-Professional Training) is an evidence-based programme developed to reduce adverse neonatal and
perinatal outcomes through local multi-professional training. A systematic approach to improving maternity safety, PROMPT encompasses
knowledge and skills training, emergency simulation, and systems improvement.
The training is typically run in situ and focuses on both the technical and non-technical skills required to manage different types of
obstetric emergency, emphasising the importance of effective communication, teamwork, and interdisciplinary work. Training is envisaged
to be compulsory for all maternity staff, led by local trainers, and bringing multi-professional clinical teams together in their normal
working environment to rehearse, reflect and improve on their collective practice (Macrae and Draycott, 2016).
The current approach for scaling and spread is the train a trainer model (T3), which entails small groups of doctors and midwives from
different maternity units attending a one-day training event led by the main PROMPT faculty. The T3 days, conducted in a non-clinical
setting, include demonstrations of how to run PROMPT locally and provide guidance and support materials (the PROMPT Course in a box) to
support the implementation of training in local maternity units.
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labour ward, 2017)
This and other observations suggested that hierarchies were man-
aged flexibly and strategically: they were mobilised when there was
need for clarifying social norms and behavioural standards, but they
were muted when not required. Consistently, actions taken did not
necessarily depend on professional hierarchies but rather on the re-
quirements of the situation. Some senior doctors were, for example,
willing to take on assistant or comforting roles when their clinical input
was not required.
We were doing all the correct things [to manage a post-partum hae-
morrhage] … And then a consultant … strolled in the room, he must
have had the view we were getting on alright, but he picked up that the
father was, as you can imagine, shaking in the corner, and so he just
came in and comforted the father. (Midwife coordinator, 2015)
Faced with an emergency, there was a collective acceptance that,
rather than organisational or professional hierarchies taking pre-
cedence, the person with the most relevant expertise would lead the
situation. Although the different responsibilities of each profession
were acknowledged, the principle of sapiential authority – authority
based on experience, or having particular information or skills
(Boreham, 2004) – was observed. Supporting collective competence
were also strong norms of cooperation and collegiality, reciprocal ties,
and personal investment.
Everybody knows everybody, you can be yourself, there's no kind of airs
and graces. […]. It's a nice atmosphere in which to work. (Obstetrician,
2015)
One of the midwives had just started her break. She looked really shat-
tered. Another midwife popped her head into the room and said “Can
anyone help me with a Synto[cinon] infusion?” And the first midwife,
who had literally just stopped, said “Well, my tea will need to cool down
anyway”, and she just jumped up and followed the second midwife in one
of the rooms. (Observation, staff room, 2017)
Crucial to supporting healthy relationships was the multi-
disciplinary staff room. Used flexibly by doctors, midwives, and other
staff, it was a break-out space that blurred boundaries between working
and socialising, and meant that working relationships were injected
with friendship, mutual trust, and an authentic desire to help. The re-
sult was that people knew each other well: they were aware of their
colleagues’ skills, strengths and weaknesses, wellbeing, and ability to
cope. They made decisions and took action accordingly.
We [have] one communal coffee room for doctors and midwives and so
those kinds of conversations that you have with people – the silly con-
versations … The personal things that people share, give you insight into
that person and perhaps how they work, and I think having the ability to
understand people … does help. (Midwife, 2015)
3.2. Insistence on technical proficiency
The unit was characterised by an unrelenting insistence on technical
competence: individuals were required to be able to perform their
clinical tasks to a very high standard of proficiency. The effects were
visible in staff confidence, readiness, and competence when under-
taking complex procedures and responding to crises (Macrae and
Draycott, 2016).
Somebody had a cardiac arrest whilst in labour … That [was] the most
stressful thing that I have ever done in my whole life … But I didn't doubt,
I didn't think …, I just did it. So, like the first five minutes I was in
complete drill mode and it's just like “This is what we have to do and this
is what we're doing”. (Locum consultant obstetrician, 2015)
The mandatory PROMPT programme was one important way in
Table 1
Mechanisms implicated in the high performance of the maternity unit at Southmead Hospital.
Mechanism Observable indicators
Collective competence • Interdependency, collegial behaviours, and strong social ties among staff• Mutual respect across roles and disciplines• Disagreements settled through open discussion rather than personal or positional power• Care organised around the shared goal of safe childbirth, with professional boundaries managed flexibly• Sapiential authority (Boreham, 2004): deference to expertise rather than hierarchy
Insistence on technical proficiency • Expectation of very high standards of proficiency in clinical tasks• High-fidelity training to develop technical competence• Informal training and role modelling in routine care delivery (e.g. clinical cases discussed during handovers or
informal conversations)• Learning through legitimate peripheral participation (Lave and Wenger, 1991)
Monitoring, coordination, and distributed cognition • Mechanisms and roles allocated to maintaining a shared awareness of the external situation in the maternity
unit• Staff in coordinating roles playing a control room function (Roe and Schulman, 2018)• Constant effort to ensure that the team is fit to cope with the circumstances
Clearly articulated and constantly reinforced standards of
practice, behaviour, and ethics
• Values and standards are clear, articulated, and reinforced through role modelling• E.g., safeguarding the dignity, safety and psychological wellbeing of women and family is paramount• Social control: individuals take actions to ensure that other people behave in a way that is aligned with the
unit's standards
Monitoring multiple sources of intelligence about the unit's
state of safety
• Data are used to sense problems• Hard indicators: routine clinical data are constantly scrutinised, updated, and made available to all staff• Soft intelligence: use of patient complaints and staff ground knowledge to learn and improve safety• Psychological safety: staff can raise safety concerns without fear of embarrassment, retaliation, or punishment
Highly intentional approach to safety and improvement • Commitment towards safety is collectively pursued and socially legitimised (not externally imposed)• Organisational citizenship behaviours: discretionary effort to promote the safety and effective functioning of
the unit• Combination of formal risk management (i.e. allocated roles and formal activities, such as safety checks) and
embedded risk management (frontline clinicians proactively preparing for risky situations and detecting small
signs of deterioration)
Structural influences on mechanisms for safety • Staffing levels• Financial resources• Physical infrastructure• Equipment• Clinical complexity
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which technical proficiency was achieved. Using interactive teaching
techniques, simulations with high quality mannequins, patient actors,
real-life equipment, and home-made props, the sessions were conducted
with as much fidelity as possible to real-life clinical practice. The focus
was on learning through doing, enabling direct experience of the feel of
techniques and the practical skills of assembling and using equipment.
Drills and simulations were typically followed by feedback from the
participants and peer-observers to encourage critical reflection and
collective sense-making.
During the neonatal resuscitation session, the PROMPT trainers were
getting people to try and use the manual respirator on the baby man-
nequin. Everyone took turns and it was really about feeling how you
place the mask over the baby's mouth, about where you rest the respirator
on your arm, about how fast you squeeze it, how you do five breaths with
a big gap. (Observation, PROMPT training day, 2014)
These formal training events were far from the only opportunity for
fostering technical proficiency. During our observations, senior staff
were highly visible on the shop floor and worked to achieve a balance
between supporting the learning of juniors and allowing them to make
autonomous decisions. For example, in setting clear standards for what
were considered appropriate actions and decisions, they explained not
just how but why, allowing colleagues to develop their skills through
reflection-in-action (Argyris and Schön, 1978). Junior staff were sup-
ported to develop their skills by participating in lower-risk tasks; we
observed numerous examples of this legitimate peripheral participation
(Lave and Wenger, 1991), which ensured that junior staff not only in-
creased their proficiency but also became acquainted with the skills,
vocabulary, and principles of the community.
The midwife coordinator asked the newly qualified midwife, “Have you
done any suturing yet?” She said no. The coordinator then said to her,
“Well if you get a small tear, the best thing you can do is to suture it
yourself but get me to come and watch you do it”. (Observation, staff
room, 2015)
Conversations were also important. Knowledge-sharing at the
backstage (Waring and Bishop, 2010), based on situational opportunity,
was common: clinical cases were frequently discussed during hand-
overs, ward rounds, or in informal conversations.
3.3. Monitoring, coordination, and distributed cognition
Assuring the safety of the unit and securing its preparedness re-
quired the constant monitoring of the functional state of the system.
Deliberate effort went into anticipating and mitigating stresses, and
facilitating shared awareness and systems of distributed cognition
(Lingard, 2009). Critical to this was a control room facility, which Roe
and Schulman (2018) characterise as a coordinating structure that seeks
to manage a critical service reliably and safely in real time.
In Southmead, this structure was achieved through explicitly char-
ging staff in specific roles (such as the midwife coordinator) with
monitoring both the unit's internal situation (e.g. its ability and readi-
ness to cope with the rapidly changing circumstances) and the external
situation (e.g. patient flow, match of staffing to need, communication
between clinical settings, and potential risks emerging from capacity
pressures). This was highly skilled work done under enormous pressure;
it required being aware of clinical situations that could deteriorate at
short notice and reallocating staff accordingly using knowledge of ex-
pertise and clinical circumstances.
The midwife coordinators here are fantastic … They really have to know
the skill-mix inside out, know exactly who they need to support and
when, and they're thinking about the bigger picture, you know, they're not
just coordinating [the] labour ward, they have to be aware of the issues
on the postnatal wards, know when there are beds coming up, who needs
to come up from the antenatal wards, who's coming in from outside … I
think part of the reason this place works so well is testament to them.
(Registrar, 2017)
Frontline clinicians – both doctors and midwives – were often ob-
served planning ahead for anticipated problems or risky situations,
aiding collective detection and awareness of hazards and ensuring that
risks were mitigated.
One of the midwives was expecting her lady to have a post-partum
haemorrhage. She grabbed the post-partum haemorrhage trolley and put
it right outside the room. She said “There's nothing I hate more than
having to do everything at the last minute during an emergency, when
you have to be in the room and you have to look after the woman and
you don't have time to go and find what you need”. (Observation, labour
ward, 2017)
Staff were also aware of the importance of real-time monitoring of
their immediate situation and unfolding events. Individuals were ac-
tively encouraged by their seniors to speak out in the moment if they
identified an unseen risk in a situation, or had concerns about the po-
tential for escalation of a problem, and were reassured that it was better
to flag up any concerns than to keep quiet.
The work of monitoring, coordination, and response was aided by
the unit's whiteboard, which was constantly updated to provide accu-
rate information on labouring women as well as general safety in-
formation. Located in the multidisciplinary staff room, members of staff
congregated around it frequently, both formally during the twice-daily
structured handovers and informally throughout work shifts and
breaks. Another important mechanism in monitoring of current state
and coordination of response lay in the handovers, ward rounds, and
board rounds that were compulsory for staff to attend and were con-
ducted with diligence.
We also have a really strong culture of doing regular ward rounds … so
we're not fire-fighting, we're trying to anticipate what's going to happen
and where risk is. (Registrar, 2017).
3.4. Clearly articulated and constantly reinforced standards of practice,
behaviour, and ethics
The unit was characterised by clear articulation and enforcement of
standards of good practice, behaviour, and ethics. For example, though
making mistakes was tolerated, hiding or ignoring them was not.
Similarly, handovers, briefings, and safety checks were taken very
seriously; staff knew they needed to arrive on time and that interrup-
tions were unwelcome. PROMPT had a key role in clarifying and re-
inforcing these shared standards, including expectations of adherence
to the unit's policies and use of local tools designed to protect safety.
The training also played a role in socialising newcomers.
The system stays the same and individuals come and go. And the in-
dividuals have to slot into a system. But they've got to be [ac]culturated
into that system, and the training day does that. (Research midwife,
2015)
We observed numerous instances of standards being articulated and
enforced in day-to-day clinical practice. Through mentorship, role
modelling and situated learning, staff members attempted to socialise
newcomers into “how things are done here”. Senior staff constantly
mobilised an image of the unit as high-performing, disciplined, and
hardworking, which in turn generated expectations that staff would live
up to shared standards.
The training days further served the important function of creating
and curating collective memories, with adverse incidents being shared
and reflected upon (Campbell and MacPhail, 2002; Guareschi and
Jovchelovitch, 2004). In some cases, the sharing of emotions also ap-
peared to be critical in helping to reinforce values of high standards of
clinical practice and avoidance of error.
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In this case, the baby had [a serious condition] that should have been
spotted, and everybody you could see was visibly upset. (Observation,
handover, 2017)
Core ethical standards were consistently reinforced, including that
of ensuring a positive childbirth experience that safeguarded dignity.
Staff strove to achieve these standards in their own practice, indicating
value congruence (Cazier et al., 2007).
The woman was close to delivery and she was in a lot of pain. The an-
aesthetist, the consultant obstetrician, the registrar, the SHO [senior
house officer] and the midwife coordinator were in the room. The con-
sultant wanted to assess her and the midwife coordinator asked everyone
to step out. She said “There's nothing worse when you are in such pain
then being examined in front of a gallery of people”. (Observation, la-
bour ward, 2017)
As observed in Bosk's classic ethnography, Forgive and Remember
(2003), as well as other studies of healthcare settings (e.g. Tarrant et al.,
2017), enforcement of standards relating to conduct and technical
proficiency mainly took the form of social control. Individuals in-
formally monitored each other's conformity to professional and social
norms and used graduated sanctions to bring behaviour back in line.
Minor problems were dealt with through talking to offending collea-
gues, often using humour or other social sanctions.
There was one junior doctor who came in late for the doctors' handover.
She was given some of the jobs to do that day that [nobody wanted].
Somebody laughed and said “Oh, enjoy your day” … It was light-hearted
but it was like a punishment as well, it definitely made a point.
(Observation, labour ward, 2015)
Participants in the ethnography and interviews explained that non-
adherence to established clinical standards was possible, so that clinical
discretion was preserved, but had to be discussed and justified, not
simply treated as an automatic privilege of status or position.
Sometimes if locums come, we might not give them a good time actually,
because if they think “I'm the consultant here I'm doing this”, and we're
thinking, “Oh no you're not” … And it's not that we're being horrible, but
… we would then say, “Well our guidelines say this, it's evidence-based.
And this is our protocol and this is what we do”. (Midwife, 2017)
Deviations from the unit's standards that were not perceived to be in
good faith, or were seen as unintentional but persistent defaults, were
actively managed through techniques such as escalation, keeping a
close eye, or buddying. Staff were also prepared to intervene more
forcefully when they felt the situation warranted it.
[The locum consultant] was managing the delivery, I was the registrar in
the room … and [he] was essentially pulling on this baby's head in front
of me. I told him not to pull, and he kept pulling, so I sort of told him to
stop and gently kind of pushed him out the way, and then took over and
delivered the baby. That was quite a brave thing to do, but I knew that I
was right … There's no point having that argument afterwards, because
you could have a baby with a paralysed arm. (Registrar, 2015)
3.5. Monitoring multiple sources of intelligence about the unit's state of
safety
The unit was committed to monitoring multiple sources of in-
telligence about safety to identify where improvements could be made.
The unit had configured, and was constantly innovating with, systems
for gathering both hard data (e.g. metrics and measures) and soft in-
telligence (e.g. staff and patient feedback) (Martin et al., 2015, 2018;
Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). An automated maternity dashboard was
used to monitor performance by identifying any concerning trends or
patterns. The data were discussed routinely in multiple forums and at
the PROMPT training days, promoting collective responsibility for
improvement.
If there are things that come up on the dashboard then people, particu-
larly the junior doctors, are encouraged to audit it to find out what the
reasons are behind that and then sometimes it can just be their own in-
itiative. (Registrar, 2017)
Importantly, data were used to sense problems rather than to seek
comfort (Dixon-Woods et al., 2014), indicating the kind of chronic un-
ease described by high reliability scholars (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).
I think we're good but we can always improve … We're probably good
compared to some other units, but there's always room for improvement.
(Focus group, 2015)
Staff themselves were respected as an important source of in-
telligence about safety concerns: their “on the ground” knowledge was
seen as an invaluable resource. The PROMPT training days were an
important forum for using staff expertise to identify hazards and
weaknesses in systems and processes. More generally, staff were en-
couraged to notice problems and operational failures (Tucker, 2004)
and bring them to collective attention rather than tolerating or working
around them (Hewitt and Chreim, 2015). Noticing took place both in
real time and during more reflective periods.
On the [white]board in the staff room, staff also write general safety
things like, say for instance “We've only got one ventouse on the ward at
the moment, let's find some others”, “The wheelchair that we have hasn't
got the feet on, we must make sure that nobody uses that anymore be-
cause it's a safety hazard”. (Observation, maternity unit, 2015)
Women on the unit were also often asked about their experiences,
and complaints were routinely investigated and used in training. The
unit also used creative ways to gain intelligence on current practice,
including, for example, requesting clerical staff to observe ward rounds
and using the feedback to inform improvements.
The secretaries thought the ward round was not well organised … The
consultant said that the secretaries had held a mirror up to them and … it
was an opportunity to make it better. (Observation in the maternity unit,
2015)
Critical to the unit's ability to gather soft intelligence, and to sense
and resolve safety problems, was its active cultivation of a sense of
psychological safety: staff could raise safety concerns and be confident
that they would not face embarrassment, retaliation, or punishment
(Edmondson, 1999). Senior staff described how they deliberately
framed risk as inherent to clinical practice but controllable, and went to
great lengths to ensure that all staff could seek help, both emotional and
technical, when needed. We observed senior staff members openly
discussing their own errors, making it normal to be honest about the
precarious nature of clinical practice and the fallibility of individuals.
[In the midwives' handover] the coordinator went on to talk about a lady
that, when she came in, they really thought wasn't progressing at all, and
they were planning to asking her to go back home. But the coordinator
then said that, on a vaginal examination, it turned out she was actually
six centimetres dilated. There were a few giggles and laughs at this and it
was very light-hearted, but it was an opportunity to emphasise that you
mustn't go by what you first think, and for the students to hear that a very
senior midwife possibly got it wrong, that that can happen to everyone.
(Observation in the maternity unit, 2015)
3.6. Highly intentional approach to safety and improvement
Individually and collectively, staff demonstrated a highly inten-
tional, deliberate approach towards safety. Rather than taking safety for
granted, it was seen as something requiring constant vigilance and
purposeful organisation. Accordingly, the unit was characterised by
attention to operational fitness – ensuring that the workflow and systems
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were optimised for the tasks that teams needed to accomplish.
Consistent with human factors principles, effort went into the design of
equipment, space, and information technology with the aim of reducing
cognitive load, enhancing convenience, and facilitating safety. For ex-
ample, algorithms, toolboxes, and stickers were widely used to support
consistent practice, and to “make the right way the easy way”
(Consultant obstetrician, 2015).
Individual accountability and responsibility towards safety relied on
staff identification with the unit's values and pride at being part of the
Southmead team. Staff demonstrated organisational citizenship beha-
viours – behaviours that are discretionary in nature (not part of an
individual's contractual tasks) and that promote effective organisational
functioning (Organ et al., 2005). The PROMPT days clearly contributed
to this by celebrating the unit's achievements and individual contribu-
tions to the collective good. Staff were consistently and explicitly en-
couraged and supported to take responsibility for making changes in
day-to-day practice by fixing seemingly small problems (e.g. tools,
objects, or procedures becoming obsolete or getting in the way of
safety) before they created substantial risk. If a solution seemed effec-
tive, it was spread and scaled-up and was publicly praised. For example,
the emergency boxes used on the unit, which contained all of the
equipment needed to handle urgent clinical scenarios, had their origins
in an idea from someone low in the formal hierarchy:
It was actually one of the maternity care assistants that said to somebody
“When we get an emergency, I'm running in and out of this room like a
tennis ball, you know, why not put [all the tools] together so that I can
just pick it all up in one thing?”. (Senior midwife, 2015)
Formal risk management systems also played an important role in
supporting safety on the unit, both in proactively identifying risks and
putting plans in place to mitigate them, and in responding to hazards
identified through intelligence-gathering. Great emphasis was placed
on reflexive practice (Argyris and Schön, 1978) and having formal
structures to support improvement.
We have the safety brief … We had a post-partum haemorrhage forum,
we've got clinical risk forums. We've got meetings … that just gives you
the opportunity to take stock and sit down and discuss your professional
opinion with professional people that you work with. (Senior midwife,
2017)
A small team of risk-managers worked collaboratively with clin-
icians to design risk management strategies. Accordingly, for the most
part, the administrative controls and workflows in the unit were ac-
cepted as sensible and facilitative of work rather than as irritating
mandates imposed from above.
3.7. Structural influences on mechanisms for safety
Not everything at Southmead worked perfectly all the time.
Sometimes things did not go smoothly: we witnessed a number of near-
misses, some of them potentially serious; procedures were sometimes
not followed; relationships occasionally frayed; and operational systems
were sometimes imperfect or malfunctioned. Although the local
PROMPT programme was maintained throughout our data collection,
we noticed some deterioration in the mechanisms underpinning safety
between our first set of observations in 2014–15 and our second set in
2017. This seemed to be associated with worsening structural condi-
tions, including financial constraints and severe staff shortages, in-
creasingly complex clinical situations, and deteriorating physical in-
frastructure.
It feels increasingly like a battle to keep [the unit] safe. It feels like at the
moment our heads are above water but it wouldn't take much for it not to
be. (Registrar, 2017).
The unit's resilience and ability to cope with adverse circumstances
became particularly vivid in these conditions. We observed many
striking examples of staff preserving safety via the mechanisms de-
scribed above, including, for example, the midwife coordinator aiding
collective situational awareness.
During the handover, the midwife coordinator said to the rest of the team
“I do need to warn you that today the corridor [linking the central de-
livery suite with the birth centre and NICU] is going to be closed from
10am to 2pm, because of plumbing works”. She said “I am going to make
absolutely sure that the birth centre doesn't take any women that have
even the slightest risk of having to be transferred to the central delivery
suite”. (Observation, maternity unit, 2017)
Adverse structural conditions (staffing, physical infrastructure, and
so on) sometimes caused severe strains. They affected proactive risk
management by hindering the team's alertness to small signs of dete-
rioration, and caused exhaustion and stress as shortages meant staff
were unable to take breaks during 13-h shifts. The increasingly chal-
lenging environment impacted on the whole system, creating frustra-
tion, sparking tensions between the trust management and frontline
clinicians, affecting collegial and supportive behaviours, creating psy-
chological distress, and reducing organisational citizenship behaviours.
Maintaining safety was becoming increasingly dependent on the
goodwill and commitment of staff, but was becoming stretched to its
limits.
[If we are still safe it is because staff] go above and beyond … Because
we give so much and stay, and we would pull together. We have hit rock
bottom in the last 18 months … Staff have been broken, upset, staff have
been in tears, [it's been] massively challenging. (Senior midwife, 2017)
4. Discussion
Using a positive deviance approach (Lawton et al., 2014), this study
enhances understanding of the mechanisms that are important to
achieving safety in maternity care. The study also advances the theo-
retical debate on quality and safety improvement by reflecting on the
interplay between interventions and context of implementation, and
empirically demonstrating their mutually constitutive nature.
4.1. Mechanisms contributing to safety at Southmead
Using the maternity unit at Southmead Hospital as a case study, our
analysis has identified six interactive mechanisms that appear to be
implicated in its outstanding safety performance (Table 1). A particular
feature of the unit was the collective character of its standards of good
clinical practice. Clinical work in the labour wards was highly inter-
dependent, characterised by extreme uncertainties, surges, and re-
source constraints. Under such conditions, individuals' technical profi-
ciency, perceived confidence in each other's skills, and proactive,
formal, and informal risk management systems were key to securing
safety. Equally important was the social organisation of work (Strauss
et al., 1985). Strong social ties and mutual investment created a sup-
portive and psychologically safe environment, but also generated rich
tacit and relational knowledge (including individuals knowing each
other's strengths and weaknesses), which, in turn, buttressed patient
safety. Though divisions of labour persisted, they were highly func-
tional; Southmead evaded the threats to safety linked to dysfunctional
relationships between doctors and midwives that have surfaced in re-
cent reports on high profile scandals in UK maternity units (Kirkup,
2015). Professional boundaries were managed in ways that supported
effective response to the unit's contextual demands (Liberati, 2017),
including unpredictability of the workload and complexity and acuity
of the case mix. The unit was able to maintain a generative tension
between nurturing a just culture (acknowledging the fallibility of in-
dividuals and the impact of faulty systems) and promoting individuals'
agency and accountability for safety (a sense that individual behaviours
can and will make a difference) (Aveling et al., 2016). Individual
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contribution was reinforced through a number of mechanisms, in-
cluding the visible commitment of senior staff, recognition and reward
of individuals' contribution, encouraging “noticing” behaviours, and
responding to concerns raised.
These findings confirm that commitment to professional values
should not be easily dismissed as purely self-serving (Freidson, 2001).
They emphasise the need to go beyond encouraging effective commu-
nication simply as a set of techniques, to appreciating the relevance of
the deeper and less visible properties of social relationships, and they
further add to scholarship that conceives of competence as highly
context-dependent and as the product of a social system, rather than
residing in an individual body or mind (Hutchins and Klausen, 1998;
Lingard, 2009).
A danger of the kind of analysis we present here is that safety is seen
as solely cultural, behavioural, or organisational in character. It is im-
portant not to dismiss the relevance of structure as well as the wider
political context. Consistent with models that conceive quality out-
comes as dependent on process as well as structure (Donabedian, 1988),
the six mechanisms we have identified are deeply influenced by
structural conditions (e.g. staffing levels, the physical environment, and
the wider organisational, social and political environment). These
findings indicate that any intervention to improve safety may founder
in inadequate structural conditions.
4.2. Bridging the gap between the ‘intervention’ and ‘context’ improvement
logics
Failure to replicate and scale successful improvement interventions
in healthcare is often attributed to either a lack of fidelity in im-
plementing the original intervention, or to the nature and character-
istics of the context in which the intervention is introduced. Though
these approaches help identify some explanations for failure to im-
prove, they do not, in contrast with recent developments in the public
health literature (Rutter et al., 2017), grant sufficient attention to the
multiple, complex, and dynamic ways in which interventions and
contexts interact. Our study of how safety is achieved in a high-per-
forming maternity unit provides a unique description of what these
interactions look like in practice, and offers empirical support for the
argument that contexts may “shape or co-construct complex interven-
tions and therefore cannot be considered separately from those inter-
ventions” (Wells et al., 2012).
The six mechanisms we have identified were fostered and constantly
reinforced through a specific safety intervention (i.e. the PROMPT
programme). PROMPT facilitated the formation of strong social re-
lationships and an ethos of openness and transparency; provided im-
portant opportunities for improving technical skills, communication,
and teamwork competence; and meant that staff felt confident in no-
ticing, and acting on, breaches of standards. But, in turn, the adoption
and sustained implementation of PROMPT itself depended on the
broader features of the unit, including the constant reinforcement of
standards of good practice and a highly intentional approach towards
safety and improvement. The unit functioned as a moralising entity,
constantly articulating shared goals and collective endeavour, and
using socialisation of newcomers and social control mechanisms as its
primary means of enforcement to ensure the stability of standards and
norms despite staff turnover. PROMPT was, on its own, far from a
magic bullet: the programme interacted constantly with the many en-
abling factors and forces that contributed to maintaining safety at
Southmead, demonstrating how intervention and context are co-con-
structive.
These findings are consistent with, and add to, the body of work on
improvement capabilities, defined as the organisational ability to use
improvement approaches and methods to enhance performance
(Furnival et al., 2017). But our analysis goes beyond the provision of a
list of high-level categories linked to safety to offer an empirically
grounded description of what these categories look like in practice, how
they interact with each other, and what organisational work needs to be
done.
The study does have limitations. As the findings are based on a
single site, it will be important to explore these mechanisms in other
maternity units and acute care settings characterised by different per-
formance, and to develop measurable indicators for profiling maternity
units on a larger scale. Our analysis is focused on the “inner context” of
a specific clinical microsystem; the “outer contexts” of the wider hos-
pital, policy, and political environment were beyond the scope of our
study, but are likely to exert their own important effects – and will be
especially relevant in attempts to scale-up in global environments.
5. Conclusions
Tempting though it may be, our analysis suggests that fore-
grounding a specific intervention or programme as the major ex-
planation for safety performance may risk rendering invisible or back-
grounding important features of context that are generative of safety.
The improvement logics of intervention and context should be under-
stood as a unity, not a duality. Safety, especially in acute care settings
such as maternity care, is an emergent property of complex systems:
enduring high performance is likely to be dependent on reshaping the
multiple, interacting features of systems (including specific interven-
tions) in a way that enables the reproduction of desired outcomes.
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